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THE USE OF IN CAMERA HEARINGS
IN RULING ON THE INFORMER PRIVILEGE

The use of informants has generally been considered a necessary facet of any adequate law enforcement program because of
the limited information-gathering and investigative capacity of law
enforcement agencies.1 This assumed need for information gained
from nonpolice sources 2 is the basis for the well-recognized governmental privilege to withhold from the defendant the identity of
informers supplying such information to law enforcement
agencies. 3 However, it is also recognized that the policies under1 There are many judicial statements to this effect. For example, in Harrington v. State,
110 So.2d 495 (Fla. App. 1959), app. denied, 113 So.2d 231 (Fla. 1959), the court
commented:
It is common knowledge that without the aid of confidential informants the
discovery and prevention of crime would present such a formidable task as
practically to render hopeless the efforts of those charged with law enforcement.
110 So.2d at 497. In discussing the informer privilege, the Supreme Court noted:
The purpose of the privilege is the furtherance and protection of the public
interest in effective law-enforcement. The privilege recognizes the obligation
of citizens to communicate their knowledge of the commission of crimes to
law enforcement officials and, by preserving their anonymity, encourages
them to perform that obligation.
Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957).
2 See also United States v. Day, 384 F.2d 464, 468, 469 (3rd Cir. 1967); Donnelly,
Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs, 60 YALE
L.J. 1091 (195 1); Comment, The Informer Privilege: What's In A Name?, 64 J. CRIM. L.
& C. 56 (1973); Comment, An Informer's Tale: Its Use in Judicial and Administrative
Proceedings, 63 YALE L.J. 206 (1953).
3 Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957). Professor Wigmore, in an often-quoted passage, describes the privilege and the policies which underly it:
A genuine privilege, on ... fundamental principle ....
must be recognized
for the identity of persons supplying the government with information concerning the commission of crimes. Communications of this kind ought to
receive encouragement. They are discouraged if the informer's identity is
disclosed. Whether an informer is motivated by good citizenship, promise of
leniency or prospect of pecuniary reward, he will usually condition his
cooperation on an assurance of anonymity-to protect himself and his family
from harm, to preclude adverse social reactions and to avoid the risk of
defamation or malicious prosecution actions against him. The government
also has an interest in nondisclosure of the identity of its informers. Law
enforcement officers often depend upon professional informers to furnish
them with a flow of information about criminal activities. Revelation of the
dual role played by such persons ends their usefulness to the government and
discourages others from entering into a like relationship.
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lying the privilege of anonymity must give way when they would
deprive an accused of his constitutional right to adequate defense.4 Therefore, a perennial judicial problem is the need to
reconcile these strong opposing policies. A study of the case law
reveals that courts evince a wide variety of solutions and attitudes
in their efforts to cope with this dilemma. In some jurisdictions
the courts display the greatest sensitivity to the needs of the
police and the privilege is nearly absolute. At the other extreme
are jurisdictions in which the courts show the most delicate regard
for the rights and needs of defendants and sharply limit the extent
of the privilege. Since this conceptual disagreement exists within
an environment of widespread use of informants by law enforcement agencies, 5 a substantial amount of irreconcilable case law
exists concerning the scope of the informer privilege. 6 Further7
more, in some states the privilege is statutorily defined.
The thesis of this article is that most of the problems of defining
the scope of the privilege in a particular case are due to the
paucity of information available to the trial judge who must rule
on the issue. Furthermore, many of the formulas presently used
are conceptually and functionally inadequate. Both of these problems can be solved by the use of in camera hearings, 8 for such
proceedings not only will provide the trial judge with sufficient
information to make a fair and rational decision, but will also
alleviate the present necessity to rule only on the basis of vague
and indefinite standards.
This article will first examine the diversity of approaches to the
problem in the case law and will then discuss one proposal of the
Supreme Court in its promulgation of rules of evidence for the
That the government has this privilege is well established, and its soundness cannot be questioned.
H. WIGMORE, 8 EVIDENCE § 2374 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (footnotes omitted; emphasis
in original), cited in McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 308-09 (1967).
4 See, e.g., Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938) (when "essential to the
defense"); Sorrentino v. United States, 163, F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1947); United States v. Li

Fat Tong, 152 F.2d 650 (2nd Cir. 1945) (dictum; when "necessary or desirable to show
the prisoner's innocence").
5 Informers are particularly crucial in any program to enforce narcotics laws. See e.g.,
THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1966) at 218, cited in United
States v. Day, 384 F.2d 464, 469 (1967) (concurring opinion).
6 See notes 21-36 and accompanying text infra.
7See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1041, 1042 (West Supp. 1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.

I10A § 412(j)(ii) (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1974); N.J. STAT. tit. 2a § 84A-28 (Cum. Supp.
1974-75).
8 While the term "in camera proceeding" may have other meanings, in this article it
refers to a closed, secret hearing attended by the trial judge, the prosecuting attorney, and
usually the informer.
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federal courts. 9 This approach may have great influence on attitudes about the scope of the privilege. Finally, an evaluation of
these proposed tests and of the proposed new standards will be

made. The article is limited to a discussion of the privilege in
instances in which the defendant is seeking disclosure of the
identity of an informant who may give testimony on issues concerning guilt or innocence but who is not produced by the prose-

cution as a witness. Situations in which the informant's testimony
is relevant only to supporting a search warrant or an arrest warrant or in which the informant is produced by the prosecution as a
witness are controlled by consitutional considerations beyond the
scope of this discussion. 10 The discussion will also be limited to
the context of criminal actions.
I. OVERVIEW AND HISTORY OF THE
PRESENT LAW

The informer privilege has deep historical antecedents in the
English common law"l Originally an absolute privilege, 12 it gradually gave way in cases where it was considered inconsistent with
the concept of a fair trial.
The case law had become extremely inconsistent. In 1937, a
federal district judge in United States v. K'eown,13 after exten-

sively reviewing all of the federal cases on point, could only
conclude that they were not "in harmony" and that the Supreme
Court had not given guidance. The court compromised by holding
that, although no disclosure was required, the prosecution could
not call any witness who knew the informer's identity and would

not reveal it on cross-examination.
The Roviaro case 14 did not come without warning. The year
9 See part F infra.
10 For purposes of showing the existence of probable cause for an arrest or search, the
prosecution normally is not required by the fourth and fourteenth amendments to disclose
the name of an informant who has supplied information about the probable cause if his
reliability can be established by testimony that he has been accurate or knowledgeable in
the past. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
If the prosecution calls an informant as a witness, his correct identity must be revealed
to the defendant. Otherwise, the right to cross-examination protected by the sixth and
fourteenth Amendments will be "emasculated." Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 131
(1968).
11 Donnelly, supra note 2 at 109 1.
12In re Quarles and Butler, 158 U.S. 532, 535-36 (1895) (dictum); Vogel v. Gruaz, 110
U.S. 311 (1884); United States v. Rogers, 53 F.2d 874 (1931); Mitrovich v. United States,
15 F.2d 163 (9th Cir. 1926).
13 19 F. Supp. 639,645 (W.D. Ky. 1937).
14 See notes 21-27 and accompanying text infra.
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after Keown was written, the Supreme Court decided Scher v.
United States.' 5 Although Scher concerns the use of an informer's communication to justify a search without a warrant, it
plays an important role in the evolution of the privilege in the
testimonial context. Because the court held that the search was
permissible on the facts of Scher without reference to any communication from the informant, the holding may be dictum even
for purposes of evaluating the propriety of the informer privilege
when determining the legality of a search. Nevertheless the court
did hold that disclosure of the informant's identity was not required because "public policy forbids disclosure of an informer's
identity unless essential to the defense, as, for example, where
this turns upon an officer's good faith." 16 The exception, although
clearly dictum, was the first serious crack in the absolute nature of
the privilege in federal court.
In the decade before Roviaro was decided the transition was
continued by three federal court cases. In Sorrentino v. United
States,17 the court, relying on Scher, held that it was error for the
trial court to sustain objections to defense questions eliciting the
informer's name. (The court, finding the error harmless because
other testimony revealed the informant's identity, did not reverse
the judgment.) The court reasoned that
[i]f the person whom Grady [the testifying federal agent]
called an informer had been an informer and nothing more,
appellant would not have been entitled to have his identity
disclosed; but the person whom Grady called an informer
was something more. He was the person to whom appellant
was said to have sold and dispensed the opium described in
the indictment. Information as to this person's identity was
therefore material to appellant's defense, and appellant was
entitled to a disclosure thereof.' 8
The same rationale was used by the court in United States v.
9 where the court held that a defendant accused of
Conforti,1
selling counterfeit money to an informer had the right to know the
identity of that informer. However, reversal of the conviction was
avoided by a finding that no proper demand for the informer's
identity had been made by the defense. Finally, in Portomene v.

15305 U.S. 251 (1938).
16 305 U.S. at 254.
17 163 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1947).
18 163 F,2d at 628-29.

19200 F,2d 365 (7th Cir. 1952).
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United States, 20 the court reversed a conviction where the defendant was accused of selling heroin to the informer but had been
denied disclosure of his identity, relying on Conforti and Sorrentino but showing some impatience with the avoidance of reversal.
A. The Roviaro Case
In 1957 the Supreme Court in the case of Roviaro v. United
States2 1 reversed a trial court's denial of the defendant's motion
for disclosure of an informer's identity and stated general principles which have provided the starting point for much of the
subsequent judicial analysis of the informer privilege. 2 2 Although
many state courts have relied on Roviaro, it should be noted that
the decision does not purport to bind the states. The Court was
deciding the law of evidence in federal courts, not a constitutional
23
issue.
In stating the standards for ruling on the privilege, the Court
appears to have articulated two different tests. The first formulation was based on whether the identity of the informer is "relevant and helpful" to the defense: if the informer's identity can be
so characterized, it must be revealed to the defendant. 2 4 The
second formulation balances "the public interest in protecting the
20 221 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1955).
21 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
22 Roviaro was arrested for selling heroin to a police informer. The informer was alone
with the defendant in an automobile during much of the transaction; a police officer in the
trunk of the automobile overheard and testified to their conversation.
23 That the Roviaro court was exercising its supervisory power over the federal courts
and not determining a constitutional question is made explicit in a later case:
In the federal courts the rules of evidence in criminal trials are governed
"by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the
courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience." This
Court, therefore, has the ultimate task of defining the scope to be accorded to
the various common law evidentiary privileges in the trial of federal criminal
cases . . . . This is a task which is quite different, of course, from the

responsibility of constitutional adjudication. In the exercise of this supervisory jurisdiction the Court had occasion 10 years ago, in Roviaro v. United
States, 353 U.S. 53, to give thorough consideration to one aspect of the
informer's privilege ....
McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 309 (1967) (citations omitted; emphasis added).
2 The Court held that:
A further limitation on the applicability of the privilege arises from the
fundamental requirements of fairness. Where the disclosure of an informer's
identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to
the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause,
the privilege must give way. In these situations the trial court may require
disclosure and, if the government withholds the information, dismiss the
action.
353 U.S. at 60-61.
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flow of information against the individual's right to prepare his
defense."2 5 All relevant factors are to be considered in this determination.2 6 The Court seems to have based its disposition of the
case on the fact that the informer was a participant in the crime
and the only witness to the transaction, 2 7 for the Court did not
explicitly apply the balancing approach to the facts of the case.
Nevertheless, the balancing test is the starting point for much of
the contemporary analysis.
The initial question for a reader of Roviaro is whether the
balancing test is consistent with the relevant-and-helpful test.
Because of the continuing heavy reliance on Roviaro by other
courts, this problem is more than academic. It is difficult to see
any place for consideration of the public interest in the protection
of confidential informants if disclosure is required whenever relevant and helpful to the defense. If the answer is that the balance is
always tipped in favor of disclosure when the informant's identity
is relevant and helpful to the defense, then the balancing test has
no content. Reliance solely upon the relevant and helpful test
would leave an absolute standard requiring disclosure when helpful to the defense, and the informer privilege would be reduced to
a general evidentiary objection denying disclosure only when such
disclosure would be irrelevant and immaterial.2 8 Moreover such a
reading of Roviaro compels the conclusion that the Court
knowingly set out inconsistent standards for the privilege. A better reading of Roviaro is that the trial courts must initially establish the relevance and helpfulness of the informer's identity to the
defense and once established then balance this against the public
interest in disclosure of the particular informant's identity. Assuming a sufficient base of data and a studied evaluation of all
relevant factors,2 9 this balancing approach would provide a very

25 The full statement of this "balancing test" is found at 353 U.S. at 62:

We believe that no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifiable. The
problem is one that calls for balancing the public interest in protecting the
flow of information against the individual's right to prepare his defense.
Whether a proper balance renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on
the particular circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime
charged, the possible defenses, the significance of the informer's testimony,
26 and other relevant factors.
Id.
27 353 U.S. at 64, 65.
28 See Comment, Disclosure of Informers Who Might Establish the Accuseds Innocence, 12 STAN. L.REv. 256, 259 (1959).
29 The Roviaro court explicitly includes the crime charged, the possible defenses, and
the possible significance of the informer's testimony within the "relevant factors" to be
considered, but this list is not exhaustive. 353 U.S. at 62.

FALL

19741"

The Informer Privilege

workable and flexible framework for correct decision-making? °
Unfortunately, such an analysis has not prevailed.
The uncertainty as to the meaning of Roviaro and the vagaries
of its standards have led to a wide variety of judicial approaches
to the problem of the exact scope of the informant privilege. The
results have been described as a "judicial guessing game."' 1 A
number of variations have developed under the direct influence of
Roviaro. Some courts require disclosure whenever the informer
was a participant in the crime a2 Some courts adopt the converse
and uphold the state's privilege to refuse disclosure whenever the
informant was a "mere informer" who did not take part in the
crime.3 3 Other courts require disclosure whenever there is a reasonable possibility that the informer has knowledge of material
elements of the casey4 Still others place a heavy burden on the
defense to show that the informer's testimony is necessary or
essential to a fair trial.3 5 Finally, some courts make an explicit
effort to balance all of the conflicting variables.3 6 The following
discussion will reveal the conceptual inadequacies of these various formulations of the informer privilege.
B. The "ParticipantTest"
As indicated previously, the Roviaro court placed great emphasis on the fact that the informer was an actual participant in the

30 United States v. Alvarez, 469 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Day, 384
F.2d 464, 469 (3rd Cir. 1967) (concurring opinion).
Judge McLaughlin's concurring opinion in Day places particular emphasis on the trial
judge's discretion in the balancing process:
The importance of Roviaro is that it remitted to the discretion of the trial
court the task of "... . balancing the public interest in protecting the flow of
information against the individual's right to prepare his defense." ... To this
purpose the court becomes the arbiter of fundamental fairness in regard to
the question of whether an informer's identity should be divulged. Judicial
discretion in this area would even seem to extend to situations where the
informer's testimony might help the accused. The Court in Roviaro stated:
[The necessary and helpful test]. Thus it appears that in no case is there a
mandatory right of disclosure but rather only a permissive right at the
discretion of the court.
384 F.2d at 469.
3' 384 F.2d at 470.
32 See part B infra.
33 See part C infra.

34 See part D infra.

35 United States v. Skeens, 449 F.2d 1066, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1971); New York v. Dolce,
41 N.J. 422, 197 A.2d 185 (1964).
36 United States v. Toombs, 497 F.2d 88 (5th Cir. 1974).
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crime,3 7 and this apjroach has been followed by other courts.3 8
For example, in Bennett v. Arkansas3 9 the Arkansas Supreme
Court reversed a conviction for possession of marijuana where
the trial court refused to order disclosure. The court held that
disclosure is required whenever the informant actually participated in the criminal transaction. 40 A concurring opinion resists
the rigidity of an absolute rule requiring disclosure when the
informer was a participant; it preferred to balance all of the
41
relevant factors.
The courts which rigidly adhere to the "participation" test may
be criticized for unduly relying on and possibly extending the
Roviaro rationale. Roviaro on its facts was a situation where the
informant was not only a participant but was essential to the
defense. Merely because a participant-informer "could" have information relevant to amplify, modify, or contradict prosecution
testimony does not mean that he will have such valuable testimony in every case. Nor do these courts consider the possibility
that the participant-informer was only one of several witnesses or
is able to contribute only highly redundant testimony or testimony
useful only to the prosecution. 42 While participation is a crucial

Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 64-65 (1957).
United States v. Gibbs, 435 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 1970); Bennett v. Arkansas, 252
Ark. 128, 131, 477 S.W.2d 497, 499 (1972); People v. Williams, 51 Cal.2d 355, 358-59
333 P.2d 19, 21 (1959); McCoy v. Maryland, 216 Md. 332, 140 A.2d 689 (1958);
Missouri v. Davis, 450 S.W.2d 168 (Mo. 1970).
Other courts have read Roviaro narrowly, restricting it to its facts. In Roviaro the
informer was a sole participant in the crime and a critical witness to the transaction. 353
U.S. at 64. In United States v. Kelly, 449 F.2d 329, 331 (9th Cir. 1971), the court upheld
the prosecution's invocation of the privilege in a participant-informer situation, distinguishing Roviaro because of the attenuated relationship between the defendant and the
informant. Similarly, in United States v. Ortega, 471 F.2d 1350 (2nd Cir. 1972), the
informer played a tiny part in a complicated conspiracy and no disclosure was required.
39 252 Ark. 128, 477 S.W.2d 497 (1972).
40 The court attached great importance to the fact of participation:
Generally, whether the privilege of nondisclosure of an informer's identity
applies depends upon whether the informer was present and participated in
the alleged illegal transaction with which the defendant is charged, or whether the informer was "merely" one who supplied only a "lead" to law enforcement officers to assist them in the investigation of a crime. The identity of an
informer is required in certain instances, particularly where he was present as
37

38

a participant. Roviaro v. United States ....

The rationale is that where the

informer is a witness to an illegal transaction, his testimony could be relevant
to amplify, modify, or contradict the testimony of a government witness, and,
therefore, essential to a fair determination of the cause.
Id. at 13 1, 132, 477 S.W.2d at 499.
41 Id. at 134-36, 477 S.W.2d at 501-502.
42 See Illinois v. Jarrett, 57 Ill. App.2d 169, 206 N.E.2d 835 (1965) where the identity
of an informer who participated in arranging for prostitution was not disclosed in defendant's trial for pandering.
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factor in any balancing process, it is not conclusive but must be

weighed in connection with other specific factors.
C. The "Mere Informer" Rule
A number of cases hold that it is not necessary to disclose the
identity of an informer who did not participate in the crime but
merely cooperated with the police.4 3 This "mere informer" test is
essentially the converse of the "participant test." In some cases
the informer introduced a police officer to the defendant so that
the officer could participate in the criminal transaction. 4" In other
cases the informer told the police that they could purchase drugs
from the defendant but never saw the police and the defendant
together. 45 In other cases applying this rule the informer was an
eyewitness to a crime but was otherwise unconnected with it
Cf. Illinois v. Williams, 38 1ll.2d 150, 230 N.E.2d 214 (1967) where disclosure of the
identity of a material witness was not required because of consistency in the testimony of
other witnesses.
Cf. United States v. Ortega, 471 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1972) and United States v. Kelly,
449 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1971), where disclosure of the identity of the participant-informers
who could not give significant testimony was not required.
43 United States v. Skeens, 449 F.2d 1066 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("The informer was an
informer and nothing more." 449 F.2d at 1070); United States v. Gibbs, 435 F.2d 621,
624 (9th Cir. 1970); Sorrentino v. United States, 163 F.2d 627, 628 (9th Cir. 1947);
Bennett v. Arkansas, 252 Ark. 128, 131, 477 S.W.2d 499 (1972); Maryland v. Lee, 235
Md. 301, 201 A.2d 502 (1964); Young v. Mississippi, 245 So. 2d 26 (Miss. 1971); New
Jersey v. Oliver, 50 N.J. 39, 231 A.2d 805 (1967).
The California Supreme Court defined "mere informer" in the following terms:
[A] "mere informer" was to be distinguished from one who was or could be a
material witness for the defense. "A mere informer has a limited role. 'When
such a person is truly an informant he simply points the finger of suspicion
toward a person who has violated the law. He puts the wheels in motion
which cause the defendant to be suspected and perhaps arrested, but he plays
no part in the criminal act with which the defendant is later charged.'..
People v. Garcia, 67 Cal.2d 830, 836, 434 P.2d 366, 370, 64 Cal. Rptr. 110, 114 (1967);
People v. McShann, 50 Cal.2d 802, 808, 330 P.2d 33, 36 (1958).
44 For example, in Maryland v. Lee, 235 Md. 301, 201 A.2d 502 (1964), the testifying
officer was introduced to the defendant by the informer; however, the informer was not
present at two sales of heroin for which the defendants were arrested. The Maryland
Supreme Court held that the general rule of nondisclosure was applicable "since the
informer
not a direct participant in the sale of heroin which formed the basis for the
appellant'swassubsequent
conviction." 235 Md. at 305, 201 A.2d at 504 (distinguishing
Roviaro).
4 For example, in Young v. Mississippi, 245 So. 2d 26 (Miss. 1971), the informer told
the police that they could purchase marijuana from the defendant but he did not see the
police with the defendant. The court upheld the privilege in the absence of proof of
participation. Id. at 27. See also Miller v. United States, 273 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1960).
46 In New Jersey v. Oliver, 50 N.J. 39, 231 A.2d 805 (1967), the court found that no
disclosure was warranted where the informer, while in the company of the agent who
testified at the trial, observed the activities for which the defendant was convicted of
bookmaking. The Oliver court's discussion reveals the policy considerations which motivated its stark holding:
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Again, the rule in these cases seems rigid. In all of the cases the
informer potentially could testify as to entrapment or mistaken
identity. In New Jersey v. Oliver,"7 a case involving a nonparticipant eyewitness, the rule was applied although there was a possibility that the informer might have offered testimony contrary to
that of a testifying eyewitness. Yet none of these cases indicates
that full consideration was given to the needs of the defense. The
New Jersey court held that in general there was only a "remote
possibility that an informer's testimony might serve some defendant." 4 8 The accuracy of that assumption is crucial for the argument. If a defendant's case may be served by such a "mere
informer," it is difficult to justify a rule of non-disclosure in all
cases.
While it seems clear that the "mere informer" test has severe
shortcomings, its use is understandable because judges are
presently required to protect the law enforcement interests in a
factual vacuum. Often they must rule on a prosecutorial invocation of the privilege before any evidence is presented. New
procedural devices are needed to provide information for a proper
determination of the potential testimonial contribution of an informer.
D. The "MaterialityTest"
The California courts require the prosecution to disclose an
informer's identity whenever there is a reasonable probability that
the informer can offer testimony material to an issue bearing on
guilt or innocence. 49 While this test is not as inherently inflexible
as the two abovementioned tests, there is a threshold problem to
impart some definitiveness to the word "materiality." The general
notion of materiality is that a court will admit only that testimony
which tends to establish facts which, as a matter of substantive
At the moment a choice seems unavoidable between a disclosure of the

witness-informer in all cases or in none at all. A policy decision must be
made and it must rest upon probabilities. In those terms the risk of loss to
defendants is pure conjecture, while the loss to society in its efforts to cope
with crime would be real and substantial. The balance being contemplated by
Roviaro must be struck in favor of law and order.
50 N.J. at 48, 231 A.2d at 810 (emphasis added). This rationale demonstrates the need for
a systematic method of presenting evidence to the trial court so that the defendant's loss
will no longer be "pure conjecture."
47 Id.
48

Id. at 47,231 A.2d at 810.
See People v. Williams, 51 Cal.2d 355, 333 P.2d 19, (1958); People v. McShann, 50
Cal.2d 802, 330 P.2d 33 (1958).
49
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law, have probative value on the issues before the court. 50 The
courts which require disclosure whenever the informer has testimony "material" to the issue of guilt have not indicated another
definition of the word. One writet' has asserted that if the term is
used in this normal evidentiary sense, then the privilege has been
virtually eliminated by the California courts, which are liberal in
determining that testimony will be probative to guilt or in52
nocence.
The "materiality test" is inferior to the balancing test in several respects. Although materiality is a minimal requirement for
all evidence, the public interest in the protection of the flow of
information to law enforcement agencies requires an informer
privilege of greater scope. Where the informant's testimony will
merely impeach a government witness of marginal importance, or
add weight to several other defense witnesses, or tend to show
entrapment in cases where the defendant is attempting to prove
that he did not even take part in a criminal act, 53 or is highly
repetitive, or is otherwise relevant and material but not crucial to
the defense, the public interest in the protection of the informant
may outweigh the particular defense need. Again, the better approach is to allow the judge to balance the conflicting values in a
54
particular case.
Of course, cases will arise in which the informer is so important
to the defense that his identity is required regardless of the danger
to law enforcement. Even courts which are committed to a balancing approach will hold that where the identity of the informant
50 1 H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2 (3rd ed. 1940.; C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 185 (2nd

ed. 1972).
51 This view is expressed in Comment, Disclosure of Informers Who Might Establish
thbe Accused's Innocence, 12 STAN. L.REv. 256 (1959).
52 The materiality test does not give certain of the benefits of other tests. While the
participant and mere informer tests are relatively mechanical, the materiality test requires
that the judge make a sensitive appraisal of the facts early in the trial. The judicial
response in California was to make the defense assume an extremely light burden of proof,
resulting in the near elimination of the privilege. See, e.g., People v. Garcia, 67 Cal.2d 830,
840. 434 P.2d 366, 373, 64 Cal. Rptr. 110, 1.17 (1967).
53 There is no doubt that in California a defendant may invoke the defense of entrapment without admitting the actual commission of the criminal acts charged. People v.
Perez, 62 Cal.2d 769, 775, 776, 401 P.2d 934, 44 Cal.Rptr. 326 (1965). Nevertheless, it is
possible that a defendant alleging such inconsistent defenses should not be permitted
thereby to force disclosure of an informant's identity. A contrary result would allow the
negation of the privilege by spurious defenses of entrapment. This problem, like so many
others, may be minimized by permitting the judge to hold secret hearings to determine the
informer's testimony with regard to the alleged entrapment (only for purposes of ruling on
the privilege). See part II, infra.
See also State v. Swaney, 277 N.C. 602, 178 S.E.2d 399 (1971).
54 See United States v. Toombs. 497 F.2d 88 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Alvarez,
469 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Day. 384 F.2d 464. 469 (3rd Cir. 1967)
(concurring opinion).
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is "crucial," "essential," or "necessary" to the defense, any public interest in law enforcement is outweighed by the needs of the
defense. 55 There is dictum that this rule is constitutionally required by due process. 5 6 However, where the testimony is material, relevant, or helpful, but not essential to a fair trial, public
defense
interest should be considered and weighed against 5the
7
needs determined by the particular facts of each case.
E. Essential, Necessary, or Crucial Test
Some cases have held that no disclosure of an informant's
identity is required unless that information is essential, necessary,
or crucial to the defense. 58 The courts employing this standard
usually puts a heavy burden of proof on the defense. 59 Of the four
rules discussed supra, the essential, necessary, or crucial test may
be the best approximation to the balancing test because it permits
55 Even courts which place great reliance on the balancing test would not allow any
public interest in law enforcement to prevail where "the informer's testimony is of vital
significance to a fair determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence." United States v.
Day, 384 F.2d 464, 469 (3rd Cir. 1967).
56 People v. Garcia, 67 Cal.2d 830, 842, 434 P.2d 366, 374, 64 Cal.Rptr. 110, 118
(1967).
57 United States v. Toombs, 497 F.2d 88 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Alvarez, 469
F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1972).
58 This is the result that would seem to be required by the MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE

rule 230:
A witness has a privilege to refuse to disclose the identity of a person who
has furnished information purporting to disclose a violation of a provision of
the laws of a State or of the United States to a representative of the State or
the United States or a governmental division thereof, charged with the duty
of enforcing that provision, and evidence thereof is inadmissible, unless the
judge finds that (a) the identity of the person furnishing the information has
already been otherwise disclosed, or (b) disclosure of his identity is essential
to assure a fair determination of the issues.
In State v. Dotson, 260 La. 471, 256 So. 2d 594 (1972), an informant tipped the police
that the defendant was in possession of drugs. The police arrested the defendant on a
traffic violation, secured a search warrant to search his person, and found some marijuana.
The defendant claimed that either the police or the informer planted the drugs in his
overcoat pocket and demanded to know the informer's identity in order to prepare his
defense. The prosecution's invocation of the privilege was upheld. The Louisiana courts
would
order disclosure of the name of a confidential informant only under exceptional circumstances for the prevention of an injustice. The burden is
upon the defendant to show exceptional circumstances justifying disclosure.
260 La. at 506, 256 So. 2d at 606. Since the defendant had no evidentiary support for
his claim that the informer had framed him by placing the drugs in his overcoat, the burden
was not met. See also State v. Braun, 209 Kan. 181, 495 P.2d 1000 (1972); State v.
Schena, 110 N.H. 73, 260 A.2d 93, 94 (1969); New Jersey v. Dolce, 41 N.J. 422, 197
A.2d 185 (1964); Dixon v. State, 39 Ala. App. 575, 105 So. 2d 354 (1958).
59 Doe v. State, 262 So. 2d I1 (Fla. 1972); Treverrow v. State, 194, So. 2d 250 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1967); State v. Braun, 209 Kan. 181, 495 P.2d 1000 (1972); State v. Dotson, 260 La.
471, 256 So. 2d 594 (1971); Gill v. State, II Md. App. 593, 275 A.2d 505 (1971); New
Jersey v. Dolce, 41 N.J. 422, 197 A.2d 185 (1964).
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due consideration of both sets of policies. The unfairness of this
approach lies in its allocation of burden of proof. While the
defense is given this burden, nearly all of the information pertaining to the informer is uniquely in the hands of the prosecution.
The courts have been motivated to this allocation of burden of

proof by the justified fear of spurious motions for disclosure of the
informer's identity by the defense intended only to force the

prosecution to dismiss the charges rather than reveal its sources 0

Clearly, a procedural device is needed to eliminate or reduce both
the fear of spurious defense motions for disclosure and the unfairness of requiring proof by the party who usually has less in-

formation.
F. Proposalfor Codification
On February 5, 1973, Chief Justice Warren Burger transmitted
to Congress proposed rules of evidence promulgated by the Supreme Court on November 20, 1972 (with Justice Douglas dissenting). 6 1 Article V of the proposed rules contained the provisions defining privileges in the federal courts. Proposed Rule 510
would have delineated the nature and scope of the informer privilege. 6 2 Public Law 93-1263 postponed the effectiveness of the
proposed rules until they were expressly approved by Congress.
On November 15, 1973, the House Committee on the Judiciary
reported favorably on a bill 6 4 that eliminated the Supreme Court's
specific rules on privileges contained in Article V. This bill was

60 For example, in New Jersey v. Dolce, 41 N.J. 422, 197 A.2d 185 (1964), the court
discussed the underlying policies:

The public interest to be served by preserving the free flow of information of
criminal activities, and by employing investigative agents who have, or acquire by deception or otherwise, access to persons engaged in such activities,
should not be thwarted unless a showing is made that a defense such as
entrapment is presented in good faith, with some reasonable factual support,
and that the informer is a material witness to the fair determination of the
defense. If the rule were otherwise, a defendant by the mere naked allegation
that he intended to rely on the defense could force the State to reveal the
name and whereabouts of the informer and, on its refusal to do so, gain
dismissal of the prosecution.
41 N.J. at 435,436, 197 A.2d at 192.
61 H.R. REP. No. 93-650. 93rd Cong., Ist Sess. (1973); Editors' Note: The History and
Progressof the Proposed FederalRyles of Evidence, 19 N.Y.L.FoR. 739 (Spring, 1974).
The texts of the order, dissent, rules, and Advisory Committee's notes are found at 56
F.R.D. 183-353 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
62 56 F.R.D. 183, 255-58 (Sup.Ct. 1972).
r3 87 Stat. 9 (1973).
1 H.R. 5463,93d Cong.. Ist Sess. (1973).
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passed by the House on February 6, 1974; at this writing, it is
awaiting action by the Senate.
The elimination of the Supreme Court's specific rules on privileges does not reflect congressional disfavor with the Court's
concept of the scope of the informer privilege in the context of
federal criminal actions; rather, Congress has not approved the
Court's effort to codify this privilege. Throughout the deliberations there was criticism that parts of the rules of evidence were
unsuited for federal codification, 65 and questions of privilege are
particularly so unsuited because they reflect substantive objectives of societal importance outside of the courtroom. Many of
these objectives are of particular interest to individual states. The
House Judiciary Committee was concerned "that federal law
should not supersede that of the States in substantive areas such
as privilege absent a compelling reason."' 66 The Committee also
felt that differences in the privilege law as among the state and
federal courts would have encouraged forum shopping in some
67
civil cases.
Yet the rejection of federal codification of the rule should not
result in total disregard of the idea, especially by the states. The
proposed Rule 5 10 would provide a powerful and efficient tool for
reconciling the competing policies in rulings on prosecutorial invocations of the informer privilege. The Roviaro balancing test,
by requiring the consideration of all of the variables that ought to
affect the disclosure, is theoretically flexible and accurate. It fails
because judges do not have sufficient information to apply it
precisely, particularly when the defense request for disclosure
occurs early in the trial. For this reason, important decisions are
sometimes made on the basis of speculation. 68 A systematic
means of acquiring data is necessary in order to allow the courts
to accurately evaluate the conflicting variables. The in camera
proceedings included in the proposed Rule 510 offers this kind of
opportunity.
The proposal would have defined the informer privilege quite
broadly:
The government or a state or subdivision thereof has a privilege to refuse to disclose the identity of a person who has
SH.R. REP. No. 93-650, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). Note particularly the testimony
of Judge Friendly, H.R. REP. No. 93-650 at 2,and the Separate Views of Hon. Elizabeth
Holtzman, H.R. REP. No. 93-650 at 27.
SH.R. REP. No. 93-650 at 9.
67 Id.
68 United States v. Day, 384 F.2d 464, 469, 470 (3rd Cir. 1967) (warns of the dangers

of reaching decisions on insufficient information).
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furnished information relating to or assisting in an investigation of a possible violation of law to a law enforcement
officer or member of a legislative committee or its staff conducting an investigation.6 9
An exception would have been provided in the case of an "informer [who] may be able to give testimony necessary to a fair
determination of the issue of guilt or innocence. " 70 The proposal
did not mention the concepts of "presumption" or "burden of
proof." Rather, it required an initial indication "from the evidence
in the case or from other showing by a party that an informer may
be able to give [the] testimony .
"...-71 If there were such an
indication and if the government invoked the privilege, an in
camera hearing would be held in which the government would
have an opportunity to show, by affidavits and, if necessary, by
testimony, "facts relevant to determining whether the informer
can, in fact, supply that testimony." 72 The judge would have to
determine whether "there is a reasonable probability that the
informer can give the testimony," and, if such a reasonable probability existed, disclosure of the informant would be required to
avoid dismissal of the charges against the defendant. Under the
proposed rule the defense would not have attended the in camera
proceedings, and all of the evidence would have been sealed and
73
revealed only in the event of appellate review.
G. Suggested Modifications
The proposed rule, while laying the foundation for a fair determination of the informer privilege, should only be viewed as a
starting point. The in camera hearing, while a necessary procedural device, is not sufficient, in and of itself.
1. The need for clarification of standards- Although the proposed rule provides a powerful procedural tool for acquiring information, it is ambiguous on some questions that have plagued
the courts. The proposal apparently would not compel disclosure
of the informant unless his testimony were "necessary to a fair
determination of the issue of guilt or innocence. " 74 Use of the
69 PROPOSED FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE
70 PROPOSED FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE

1972).
71
72

Id.
Id.

73 Id.
74 Id.

510(a), 56 F.R.D. 183, 255 (Sup.Ct. 1972).
510(c)(2). 56 F.R.D. 183. 255-58 (Sup.Ct.
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word "necessary" implies that the disclosure would be required
only where the exercise of the privilege would make a fair determination of innocence impossible or very difficult. However, the
Advisory Committee Note cites Roviaro,75 which would require
disclosure not only when necessary to a fair determination of guilt
or innocence, 76 but also "whenever relevant and helpful to the
defense." 77 It would, therefore, seem that the proposed rule
78
adopts a stricter standard than the relevant-and-helpful test
although the Advisory Committee Note invites a judicial softening. 79 Both standards appear too rigid. Where disclosure of the
particular informant will not affect the law enforcement agencies,
the courts might be permitted to force disclosure if truly helpful to
the defense even though a fair trial would be possible otherwise.
Where the disclosure would be especially burdensome to the
police, disclosure should not be forced, even if helpful to the
defense, unless a fair decision is thereby precluded. This latter
result is often reached where the prosecution is able to convince
the court that the informer is in extreme peril and physical dan80
ger.
2. The need to extend evidentiary considerations- The proposal also limits the evidence which can be adduced in secret to
"facts relevant to determining whether the informer can, in fact,
supply that testimony."8 1 However, the state should be permitted
to show particular circumstances which make disclosure particularly dangerous to the public. It might be that the informant is
uniquely valuable due to his position in the underworld, and his
detection could terminate a rich source of information to the
police. There may be evidence that the informant would be in
physical danger if his identity were made known to the defend75 PROPOSED FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 5 10, Advisory Committee Note, 56 F.R.D.

183, 255-58 (Sup.Ct. 1972).
76 See note 24 supra.

77See note 24, supra.
78The proposed rule does not explicitly recognize the consideration of the public
interest in law enforcement in determining whether disclosure is required. Nevertheless,
see Krattenmaker, Testimonial Privileges in Federal Courts: An Alternative to the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEO. L.J. 61, 83 (1973): "[Rlule 510 would tighten
substantially the government's informer privilege and rather consistently chooses to give
full protection to government interests at the expense of defendants."
79 PROPOSED FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 510, Advisory Committee, 56 F.R.D. 183,
255-58 (Sup.Ct. 1972).
80 For example, in United States v. Toombs, 497 F.2d 88 (5th Cir. 1974), the court

refused to require disclosure when the prosecution showed in an in camera hearing that
the informer, who was quite useful to law enforcement personnel, had been shot three
times subsequent to the crime in question.
81 PROPOSED FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 510(c)(2), 56 F.R.D. 183, 255-58 (Sup.Ct.
1972).
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ant.8 2 Harm to any informant is likely to discourage the public
from communicating with police.8 3 The prosecution ought to have
an explicit right to give evidence of such peril to the trial court
84
without the need of showing the evidence to the defense.
II.

ANALYSIS OF STANDARDS FOR THE
IN CAMERA PROCEEDINGS

A. The Need for the Proceeding
In order to rule on an invocation of the informer privilege in a
systematic manner, the trial judge must be able to reduce a large
number of factors to a relatively certain balance. The unique
nature of the informer privilege requires a more thorough investigation of substantive issues than is usual in evidentiary rulings. The private, in camera hearing may be the best means of
acquiring the requisite base of data because it allows the prosecution to argue fully against disclosure without undermining the
privilege in the process of that argument. Such a systematic
means of reducing uncertainty would enable the courts to discard
the fairly crude approximations which have been used. The
"mere informer" test, the "participant" test, and the other standards described above are all paradigms of informer situations
that are only accurate on occasion. In camera hearings would
enable the court to go beyond these tests to ascertain and give
relevance to complex fact patterns.
B. The Allocation of Burdens of Proof
Initially there should be a presumption in favor of the privilege.
There are two fundamental reasons for this view. One reason is
that while the needs of a particular defendant must be proved in a
given case, the court may safely assume in all cases that the
public has an interest in preserving a climate of confidentiality for
informants. 8 5 Under normal circumstances any disclosure of an
informant's identity can diminish the general confidence of informers in the secrecy of their identities; this result can impair law
enforcement.8 6 Therefore, until evidence is introduced, the balSee, e.g., note 80 supra.
United States v. Day, 384 F.2d 464, 46 (3d Cir. 1967) (concurring opinion).
This is provided by PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 5 10(c)(2). The record
is sealed for appellate review.
85 See notes I and 3, supra.
86 New Jersey v. Oliver, 50 N.J. 39, 47. 48, 231 A.2d 805, 810 (1967).
82

83
84
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ance initially should be tipped against the needs of the defense
and in favor of the needs of law enforcement agencies. The
second reason for the presumption in favor of the privilege is that
courts have been concerned about the possibility that the privilege
will be undermined by mere allegations, speculation, and tactical
maneuvering. 8 7 The judicial experience has been that many defendants seek the informant's identity only to force the prosecution to terminate the case rather than lose its sources. 88 Therefore, there should be an initial presumption in favor of the privilege, and a requirement that the defense come forward initially to
rebut that presumption. 9
However, as previously discussed,9 0 the very nature of the
privilege makes it difficult for the defendant to show the informer's knowledge or the importance of his testimony to the
defense.9 1 In contrast, the prosecution, knowing the informer's
identity has a greater capacity to demonstrate his suitability as a
witness.9 2 Such a factor is important in apportioning burdens of
proof.9 3 It nevertheless appears that the courts should retain the
policy of requiring the defense to sustain the initial burden of
coming forward to show that the privilege should not prevail in a
particular case.
One option is to raise an initial presumption in favor of the
privilege and give the defense the burden of specifying defenses
dependent upon knowledge of the informer's identity. 94 This
would reduce spurious attempts by the defense to obtain disclosure. Once the defense has overcome the initial presumption,
the prosecution could bear the burden of proving that the privilege
87

See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 273 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1960), where the court is

quite concerned with the danger to the privilege:

[The record must reveal a] factual basis for the assertion that 'it is well within
the realm of probability.' If the informer's relation to the acts leading directly

to or constituting the crime may be assumed from a fertile imagination of
counsel, the Government in practically every case would have to prove
affirmatively that the informant had not done any such likely act. Having
done that, all would be revealed and the informer privilege, deemed essential
for the public interest, for all practical purposes would be no more.
273 F.2d at 28 1.
See note 60, supra.
89 See notes 59 and 60, supra.
90 See part IE, supra.
91 Price v. Superior Court, I Cal.3d 836, 843, 463 P.2d 721, 725, 83 Cal. Rptr. 369, 373
88

(1970); Honore v. Superior Court, 70 Cal.2d 160, 170, 449 P.2d 169, 174, 74 Cal. Rptr.
233, 234 (1969).
92

Id.

93 JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE, § 7.8 (1965).

94 Since the defense is usually given the burden of proving its need for the informant's
identity, this option represents a decrease in the burden placed on the defense. See part IE
supra.
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should be upheld. 9 5 In overcoming the initial presumption the
defendant should be required to specify 9 6 consistent 97 defenses so
that the judge can truly gauge the importance of the informer's
testimony and insure that the defense counsel is acting in good
faith. With evidence, affidavits, and pleadings, the defendant
should show (for purposes of the motion for disclosure) that the
defenses have some basis in fact.9 8 The defense should also state
the nature of the testimony required from the informer, any reason why the informer might be expected to have such testimony,
and the materiality of the expected testimony to the specified
defenses. If the trial judge feels that the defense may have cause
to learn the informant's identity but that it cannot show cause
because of insufficient evidence, then he should proceed to examine the informant or law enforcement officials in secrecy; the
burden of defending the privilege should shift to the prosecution.
The prosecution, knowing the identity of the informant, can easily
reveal further facts in secret hearings. Such facts might show that
the informer is not able to supply the testimony which the defense
expects. Alternatively, the prosecution might show that the informer's testimony would lend only marginal support to the defense and that the value of the testimony is outweighed by the
danger to law enforcement in exposing the informer's identity. In
order to avoid undermining the privilege while meeting its burden,
the prosecution should be permitted to present its proof in private
hearings, with a sealed record for appellate review. Any disadvantage to the defendant could be partially neutralized by permitting defense counsel to submit lines of questioning to the court.
C. ProblemAreas
There is a natural tendency to recoil at the suggestion of secret
hearings. They should not be used except for a limited and pre95 This position was taken by the court in United States v. Eddings, 478 F.2d 67 (6th
Cir. 1973) (dictum):
When the evidence suggests . . . that it is reasonably probable that the
informer can give relevant testimony, the burden should be on the Government to overcome this inference with evidence that the informer cannot
supply information material to the defense.
478 F.2d at 71.

96 See note 60 supra.
17 See State v. Swaney, 277 N.C. 602, 178 S.E.2d 399 (1971); Comment. Disclosure of
Informers Who Might Establish the Accused's Innocence, 12 STAN. L. REv. 256, 261-63
(1959). After the publication of this Comment, which was critical of the emerging California law, the California Supreme Court strongly defended the practice of requiring disclosure of the identity of an informer in order to prove entrapment when the defendant was
pleading an inconsistent defense (such as mistaken identity). See People v. Perez, 62
Cal.2d 769, 775, 776. 401 P.2d 934, 937,938, 44 Cal. Rptr. 326, 329, 330 (1965).
98 Clearly such a showing in camera, would bear not upon the issues of guilt or
innocence, but only upon the evidentiar, nhlestions.

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 8:151

cisely defined purpose, and then only if there is a significant public
interest to be protected. Despite these limitations, there has been
restricted judicial acceptance of the use of such proceedings for
determining whether to uphold a prosecutorial invocation of the
informer privilege? 9 The danger of misuse of confidential hearings
would be minimized if a record of them were sealed and made
available for inspection on appellate review.10 0 Furthermore, the
information adduced in secret hearings would be used only for
evidentiary rulings and not on the ultimate issues of guilt or
innocence.
One aspect of the in camera procedure which is rarely considered is the possibility of in camera participation by defense counsel. Since the absence of defense participation is one of the
serious weaknesses of the process, the underlying assumptions
behind such total exclusion deserve close scrutiny. Certainly it is
possible to have in camera hearings in which the defense counsel
but not the defendant is present. The differences between in
camera hearings and open court hearings are severalfold: the
defendant is not present in the former while he is present in the
latter situation; the public is not admitted in camera; no reports to
the general public are possible in camera;and the defense counsel
may not be present. Allowing the defense counsel to participate in
camera (conditioned by a judicial order of silence) could vitiate
the most important advantage of the in camera proceeding. The
crucial question is whether the considerations that led to the
creation of the privilege require that the defense counsel as well
as the defendant be barred from the in camera hearing.
The informer privilege was created to protect the flow of information from private citizens to law enforcement agencies.
Therefore, the privilege has always been thought to belong to the
State and not to the informer himself.1 01 This flow of information
may be endangered in two general ways. One danger is that
informers who are privy to important information and who are
valuable to the police may be discovered, harmed, or made less
useful. The other broad danger is that potential or actual informers will fail to communicate with the police because they
wish to avoid the peril or inconvenience which would accompany
the disclosure of their identities. Of course these two dangers
interact: harm to one informer is likely to influence the conduct of
others. Therefore, any definition of the informer privilege must
11 See

note 68, supra.

'00 PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE/5 I0(c)(2); United States v. Day, 384 F.2d

464 (3rd Cir. 1967).
10I See note 3, supra.
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take into account both the real danger to informants and the
informants' perceptions of the danger to themselves.
There does not appear to be any data to indicate the actual
danger into which informers would be placed by the disclosure of
their identities to defense counsel. One cannot discount the possibility that some lawyers would willfully disclose the identity of an
informer to their clients or others, notwithstanding judicial orders
of silence or general ethical principles. There is also the likelihood
that a general dissemination of information concerning informers
might result in disclosures occasioned by carelessness or lack of
sufficient security-consciousness among attorneys or clerks. It is
not difficult to imagine a case in which hearings would show the
privilege to be applicable but in which the state would abandon
prosecution because it did not trust the defense counsel. Although
the distinction between the defense counsel and the defendant
may be inappropriate or even naive in some cases, it may be that
these problems would be reduced where the defendant is represented by public defenders.
Whatever the real danger to informers of allowing defense
counsel to participate in in camera hearings, such a procedure
would probably constrict the flow of information to the police.
Few informers will feel secure in the knowledge that their identities will be revealed to the chosen counsel of the defendants.
Many informers who fear for their lives when their identities are
known only to a few police officers may be expected to withdraw
their services upon learning that unknown attorneys will know
their identities. Rules governing the informer privilege must accurately reflect the perceptions of terrified people. Of course, this
rule should not be inflexible. Determinations of the appropriateness of the privilege are inherently within the discretion of the
court. In some circumstances the judge may feel that a disclosure
is appropriate, but only if limited to defense counsel. In some
cases it may even be possible for the judge to apprise the informer
of the relationship between the accused and counsel, and, if the
informer felt sufficiently secure, allow defense counsel to participate in camera. Where the informer objected, the hearing would
continue without defense counsel. But the general disclosure of
informants' identities to defense counsel is likely to compromise
the fundamental public policy underlying the privilege. Therefore,
in the usual case no legal distinction should be drawn between the
defense counsel and the defendant for purposes of disclosing the
identity of an informer.
Some courts have rejected secret hearings because of concern
over the fact that the judge would learn the name of the in-
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formant.' 0 2 The rationale seems to be that informers would fear
any disclosure of their identities to other than a limited number
of local law enforcement agents.' 0 3 Courts using secret hearings
04
have found informers too terrified even to speak with the judge.1
However, of those informants who are in such desperate circumstances, some will have testimony necessary for a fair trial, and a
defendant should be guaranteed an accurate assessment of that
possibility.
In certain instances, the prosecution may be able to show that
the privilege should be upheld without the necessity of having the
court interview the informant or learn his identity. For example,
the prosecution may be able to adduce evidence from police
officers of the extent of the informer's knowledge. Under the
proposed procedure, exposure of the informant to the judge could
be required for an intelligent ruling on the invocation of the
privilege, but, at the same time, needlessly harm the system of law
enforcement. This result would obtain only if two conditions
coincide: (1) the court would find that disclosure of the informant's identity to the defendant is inappropriate; and (2) the
informer fears that exposure to the judge would compromise his
security. Where these conditions are met, and where the prosecution is unable to show the necessity of the privilege without
revealing the informer's identity to the judge, the prosecution can
protect its informant by accepting dismissal of the charges. In
other cases, the advantages of the in camera hearings will warrant
exposure of the informant to the judge.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The balancing test is extremely abstract. While it is theoretically superior to other tests, it is difficult to apply in practice
and requires that the court have early access to the facts of the
case. In practice the courts have been unable to develop fixed
disclosure rules. The appropriateness of the privilege is dependent
on subtle variations in the facts. The fixed models, though inconsistent with subtle variations, are necessary because of the
scarcity of relevant information available to the court at the early
stages of a case. The use of in camera hearings, from which the
defendant is excluded, offers the trial court the best opportunity to
obtain information needed to balance the needs of the defense
against the public interest of law enforcement.
- Ronald E. Levine
102

State v. Oliver, 50 N.J. 39, 48, 231 A.2d 805, 810 (1967).

103 Id.
04
1 United States v. King, 335 F.Supp. 523, 555 (S.D. Cal. 1971).

